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Is there a trade-off between 
deepening and widening? 
What do Europeans think? 
 
Antonia M. Ruiz-Jiménez 
José I. Torreblanca 
Following the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, EU traditional 
enlargement policy has been called into question. Whereas in the past, the so-called 
‘deepening and widening’ processes have gone hand in hand, a much more conservative 
policy and mood about enlargement has now taken hold. With discussions about the 
Constitutional Treaty and future enlargement rounds dominated by a widespread 
consensus on the existence of so-called ‘enlargement fatigue’ and concerns about ‘EU 
absorption capacity’, the question of public support for enlargement has become crucial.  
With the promise (or threat) to hold national referenda to ratify the accession of new 
member states, the traditional EU enlargement policy has undergone an important change. 
Whereas in the past the accession of new members was decided in two parallel series of 
negotiations (one among existing members, the other between existing members and the 
candidates), it now seems evident that new enlargement rounds are going to require a 
third set of agreements (between political elites and the public). Public support for 
enlargement might affect enlargement policy in two ways, one explicit, the second 
implicit. In the first case, member states or the Union itself would decide to hold popular 
referenda to validate new accessions. In the second case, EU leaders would stop or speed 
up accession processes according to the perceived levels of public support. In both cases, 
public support will be crucial. 
The three questions this paper poses are crucial to this debate. First, do citizens share with 
political elites the perception that there is a trade-off between deepening and widening? 
Second, how do we explain the variation in levels of support for EU enlargement? Third, 
what sort of fears are citizens actually harbouring when they express opposition to 
deepening and widening? 
What are our findings? We find, first, that despite the recent rise of negative attitudes 
towards enlargement, there is still a positive correlation between support for deepening 
and support for widening. Thus the alleged trade-off between both elements is more 
apparent and real. We also find that negative attitudes towards enlargement are 
concentrated among older members states. Third, we find that fears about the future 
(crime, immigration, sovereignty, etc.) explain losses in support for both integration and 
enlargement. We conclude by questioning whether a more restrictive enlargement policy 
would increase public support for integration 
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IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN 
DEEPENING AND WIDENING? 
WHAT DO EUROPEANS THINK? 
ANTONIA M. RUIZ-JIMENEZ
∗  AND JOSE I. TORREBLANCA
♣ 
Introduction 
After the negative results of the May-June 2005 Constitutional Treaty referendums in France 
and the Netherlands, it has become commonplace to place responsibility for the current crisis on 
the 2004 enlargement. Besides the alleged institutional difficulties that the increase from 15 to 
27 members has presented to the EU, policy- and opinion-makers have repeatedly cited low 
support for enlargement among European citizens as one of the causes of so-called ‘enlargement 
fatigue’ or ‘enlargement indigestion’.  
Following this diagnosis, a more conservative policy regarding future enlargements has 
emerged, stressing elements such as “absorption capacity” and the need to ensure wider levels 
of public support before launching new rounds of accession.
 The June 2006 European Council 
meeting resulted in a request to the Commission to prepare a report on enlargement that “should 
also cover the issue of the present and future perception of enlargement by citizens and should 
take into account the need to explain the enlargement process adequately to the public within 
the Union”. On 12 October, the European Parliament stressed “the importance of taking into 
account public acceptance of enlargement and recalls the responsibility of Europe’s political 
leaders in explaining to the public the goals and mutual advantages of enlargement and the 
unification of Europe”.
1 On 8 November, the European Commission adopted a communication 
recognising that despite the benefits of enlargement the public’s perception was negative, and 
concluded that while the EU’s integration capacity was determined by the EU’s own capacity to 
maintain the momentum of European integration, and by candidate countries’ ability to fulfil 
rigorous conditions, “better communication on enlargement” was also essential (European 
Commission, 2006c). 
These policy changes reflect that the compatibility between the so-called processes of 
‘deepening’ and ‘widening’, which in the past tended to be taken for granted, has now been put 
into question. This view has been summarised by the Commission’s Director General for 
External Affairs, Eneko Landáburu, who recently wrote: “Enlargement has been a key tool in 
projecting stability across our continent. But it is a reality that the EU cannot expand ad 
infinitum – everything has its limits. We must honour our present basic commitments, while 
strictly insisting on the criteria. One of these criteria is our own absorption capacity – it is clear 
that in some member states the pace and scale of enlargement is approaching the limits of what 
public opinion will accept” (Landáburu, 2006, emphasis added). 
This change in the EU’s enlargement policy has not gone unnoticed. In fact, it has been severely 
criticised. Barysch (2006), Durand & Missiroli (2006), Emerson, et al., (2006), Hassin (2007), 
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Moravscik (2006) and Torreblanca (2006), among others, have questioned the way this policy 
change has emerged and challenged the concept of “absorption capacity” and its political 
exploitation. Enlargement, these analysts point out, is not the cause of the EU’s current ills. 
Therefore, though it is true that the EU needs institutional reform if it is to further enlarge, 
putting an end to enlargement will not by itself solve current problems.  
Two aspects of the ‘deepening versus widening’ debate are particularly worth exploring: impact 
and perceptions. Questions about impact deal with objective facts. Is it true that the enlarged 
Union functions less efficiently because of enlargement? Have the Union’s institutions 
collapsed because of enlargement? How costly has enlargement been in terms of trade, 
investment, the EU budget or jobs – in other words, has the EU benefited from enlargement? All 
these questions can be settled empirically, and if not definitively then at least substantially.  
A second aspect of the debate poses questions addressing more subjective views, i.e. with 
citizen perceptions of enlargement. Does public opinion perceive integration and further 
enlargement as incompatible processes? How do citizens link these two processes of deepening 
and widening? How do we explain variations in support for enlargement across countries? To 
what extent are opinions held by the wider public similar to those of European elites? What are 
the fears that explain opposition to the Union’s deepening and widening? In other words, to 
paraphrase Landáburu (2006, cited above), just how much enlargement can EU citizens take? 
Following the negative referenda in France and the Netherlands and the ensuing changes in EU 
enlargement policy, questions about perceptions have become as crucial as those about impact. 
Detailed studies on the impact of enlargement on the functioning of EU institutions and on the 
economy, trade and immigration conclude that enlargement has been economically beneficial 
but that decision-making has become more difficult (though not impossible) (CER, 2006; 
European Commission, 2006, 2006a; Hagemann & De Clerck-Sachsse, 2007; Kurpas & 
Schönlau, 2006; Kreppel & Gungor, 2006). As the Commission summarised in its 2006 
Communication about enlargement, “economically, enlargement has helped to increase 
prosperity and competitiveness, enabling the enlarged Union to respond better to the challenges 
of globalisation. This has brought direct benefits for Europe as a whole. Enlargement has 
increased the EU’s weight in the world and made it a stronger international player” (European 
Commission, 2006c).  
Therefore, when we look at the impact of enlargement, there does not seem to be much 
difference with respect to previous enlargement rounds (at least in the sense that all of them 
proved to be economically beneficial but also required institutional changes to improve EU 
decision-making efficiency). This would mean that recent enlargement policy changes, which 
have led to a more restrictive approach to enlargement, were driven more by elite perceptions of 
the public’s negative evaluation of enlargement policy than they were by enlargement’s 
negative economic or institutional consequences. However, one could ask whether negative 
citizen views of enlargement are a consequence of negative elite assessment of enlargement 
rather than a cause of it. But to settle this question, we first need to explain the subjective 
aspects of enlargement, i.e. why the European public has so negatively assessed the most recent 
round of enlargement. 
Using post-enlargement Eurobarometer data, this paper explores public support for deepening 
and widening across the EU. In particular, it tries to answer the following questions: (1) Do 
citizens perceive a trade-off between deepening and widening? (2) Is there a gap between elite 
discourses and citizen perceptions regarding deepening and widening? (3) Which fears lay 
behind citizens’ preferences for deepening versus widening?
2 
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In the first section, we look at the historical trend in public support for enlargement. In the 
second section, we look at elite views and assessments of the 2004 enlargement and its 
consequences during the current constitutional crisis. Then, in section three, we examine to what 
extent European citizens perceive a trade-off between deepening and widening. In section four, 
we take a closer look at the factors, mainly fears, behind negative attitudes for both integration 
and enlargement. In section five we explore whether, and how, those fears affect the perception 
of a trade-off between the processes of deepening and widening, and to what extent these 
perceptions are similar among citizens and elites. The concluding section summarises our 
findings and discusses their policy implications. 
1.  Trends in support for 2004 enlargement and further enlargement 
Figure 1 considers the EU-15 as a whole during 2000-04 and shows that the percentage of 
citizens who supported the 2004 and future enlargements hovered between 40-50%.  
Figure 1. Percentage of support for 2004 enlargement and future enlargements  
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Source: Eurobarometer (as indicated in the figure). 
After final accession negotiations began in January 2000, support for the 2004 enlargement 
increased until 2002 (possibly owing to increased media attention). However, after negotiations 
closed, in December 2002, support for the 2004 enlargement decreased during 2003 and 2004 as 
the accession date neared (possibly because the media shifted attention to enlargement 
consequences). Thus, in the spring of 2004, support for the 2004 enlargement was slightly lower 
than in the spring of 2000, while support for further enlargements reached the lowest point of 
this time period. 
However, as shown in Figure 2, support for further enlargements increased after the accession 
of the 10 new member states. If we compare public support for the 2004 enlargement to support 
for further enlargements, the figures are quite similar (or at least not significantly different if we 
exclude the period between EB56 and EB58). We must also point out that the decreasing trend 
in support for further enlargements is not directly attributable to the negative results of the 
constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands. Although they might have had an 
impact, the trend was already apparent. 
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Figure 2. Net support for 2004 enlargement and future enlargements, EU15 
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Source: Eurobarometer (as indicated in the figure). 
We can better understand these trends by looking at the ‘net’ support for enlargement (i.e. the 
percentage of the population in favour of enlargement minus the percentage of the population 
against it). We can think of this measure as an indication of consensus in public opinion: low 
figures (in absolute terms) will indicate a lack of consensus,
3 while higher ones (in absolute 
terms) will indicate either a positive or negative consensus depending on the sign.
4 If we take 
figures higher than 10 as indicating moderate consensus, it can be seen in Figure 2 that at the 
EU-15 level there was a positive consensus on the 2004 enlargement only between the autumn 
of 2001 and the autumn of 2002 – that is, during negotiations, when the topic was more salient. 
However, right before the accession the consensus was negative (for the 2004 enlargement but 
not for further enlargements).
5 Otherwise, before and after that period, European public opinion 
(EU15) has been fairly divided between those in favour of and those against the enlargement 
process.  
The same thing is true for further enlargement: at the EU-15 level public opinion is fairly 
divided between those in favour of and those against it. Furthermore, although public opinion is 
divided at the EU-15 level, it is less so at the EU-25 level and reaches a clear positive consensus 
within the NMS-10+ (Figure 3). Thus between the autumn of 2004 and 2005 there was a 
moderate positive consensus in favour of further enlargements at the EU-25 level. Within new 
member states, there has been and still is a strong consensus in favour of further enlargement. 
                                                 
3 We take values below 10 (in absolute terms) as indicative of divided opinions or lack of consensus. 
4 We take values greater or less than 10 as indicating positive or negative consensus of public opinion. 
This measure excludes those who answered “I don’t know” or did not answer the question. These citizens 
can be considered as non-attitude-holders. It is likely that they will make up their mind depending on 
what they perceive as the mainstream public opinion climate and/or the policy initiates. Therefore, only 
those citizens who express an opinion have an impact on creating a public opinion climate that will 
influence other citizens. See, for example, the theory of the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; 
Scheufele & Moy, 2000). 
5 The difference is, in part, because more people expressed an opinion regarding the 2004 enlargement 
than regarding further enlargements.  IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN DEEPENING AND WIDENING? | 5 
 
Nevertheless, we must mention Turkey as a special case of extremely high negative consensus. 
In relation to Turkey we find sustained low (even shrinking) levels of popular support at least 
since 2000 (Ruiz-Jiménez & Torreblanca, 2007: 7-9). This high negative consensus is clear not 
only among the EU-15 but also among the NMS, which is also a particularity of Turkey. The 
case is relevant and requires mentioning because many arguments put forward by elites about 
the trade-off between deepening and widening revolves around Turkey in particular. 
Figure 3. Net support for future enlargements, EU-15, EU-25 and NMS-10+ 
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Source: Eurobarometer (as indicated in the figure). 
Statistics on support for enlargement at the EU-15 level hide, of course, many divergences 
among member states. But in 2000-04, only in France was there a moderate consensus against 
the 2004 enlargement. In seven countries (Germany, Austria, Denmark, the UK, Belgium and 
Luxembourg), there has not been a clear public opinion climate, i.e. no clear consensus either in 
favour of or against the 2004 enlargement. However, in eight countries there has been a 
moderate (the Netherlands and Finland) or strong (Sweden, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Spain and 
Greece) positive consensus in favour of the 2004 enlargement.  
If we compare these statistics (Figure 4) with the mean net support for further enlargements 
among these same countries (Figure 5), we observe that between 2004 and 2006 a moderate 
negative consensus arose in Austria, Germany and Luxembourg, and increased in France. In 
these four countries, the percentage of citizens against further enlargement is much higher than 
the percentage in favour of it. In six countries, however, public opinion still remains fairly split, 
with no clear consensus either in favour of or against further enlargement (Finland, Belgium, 
Denmark, United Kingdom and Sweden). At the same time, however, the positive consensus in 
favour of further enlargements remains strong only in southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece and 
Portugal) and Ireland. 
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Figure 4. Mean net support for enlargement EB54(2000) to EB61(2004) 
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Sources: EB54(2000), EB55(2001), EB56(2001), EB57(2002), EB58(2002), EB59(2003), EB60(2003), 
EB61(2004). 
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Figure 5. Mean net support for further enlargement EB61(2004) to EB65(2006) 
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Sources: EB62(2004), EB63(2005), EB64(2005), EB66(2006). 
This leads us to conclude, first, that support for enlargement was already declining well before 
the Constitutional Treaty was put to referenda in 2005 in France and the Netherlands. Second, 
that this trend is not homogeneous across EU member states but quite entrenched among some 
of them, whereas in the other member states public opinion is either fairly divided or clearly in 
favour of further enlargements, except in the case of Turkey (and to a lesser extent Albania). Let 
us now examine elite views as reflected in their discourses. 
2.  The elite’s perception of a trade-off between deepening and widening  
To establish whether there is a gap between the elite’s and citizens’ discourses and attitudes 
regarding the deepening and widening of the EU, we proceed first to an analysis of elite views. 
This can be achieved with the aid of well-established sources such as the online EU-25 Watch 
(2006), which offers reliable information about government positions throughout the EU on a 
wide range of issues related to European policy.
6  
                                                 
6 The EU-25 Watch (2006) is an expert survey involving research institutes from all EU member states, 
coordinated by the IEP in Berlin (http://www.iep-berlin.de/index.php?id=476). Concerning possible 
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The report shows that wide sectors of the elite, especially politicians and mass media, tend to 
link the European Constitution crisis to the consequences (or fear of consequences) of 
enlargement. Summarising the EU-25 Watch report’s main findings, the coordinators make the 
following assessment about the relation between deepening and widening: “Enlargement fatigue 
sweeps through the old member states...EU fatigue is on the rise in the new member states also. 
The consolidation and the limits of the EU in political, functional and also geographical terms is 
becoming a major concern in member states” (Lippert & Goosman, 2006: 5).  
The report thus makes clear the existence of an ‘indigestion syndrome’, which has economic, 
political and identity dimensions. Within the economic dimension, the EU-25 Watch report 
explores issues related to the financing of enlargement, the impact on structural and agricultural 
policies, and economic competition over jobs, trade and foreign investment between old and 
new member states. Within the political dimension, enlargement is frequently cited as 
responsible for difficulties in the Union’s institutional functioning. Further enlargement, 
especially if the European Constitution is not approved, is feared to have a paralysing impact on 
the European institutions. Regarding identity, the complex relation between deeper integration 
and further enlargement is most obvious in relation to the possible inclusion of large countries 
with large populations of Muslim citizens, especially Turkey. With no clear cultural identity, 
concerns centre on the likely stagnation of the Union’s capacity as a unitary actor. In fact, there 
are many instances cited by the EU-25 Watch report in which the constitutional crisis is linked 
to the rejection of Turkey’s future accession in particular rather than of future enlargements in 
general.
7 
This “enlargement fatigue that sweeps through old member states”, which the report mentions 
several times, is related in several country reports to “a change…that acknowledges the need of 
consolidation and functioning of the EU rather than promoting expansion further and further to 
the East”. It is further pointed out that this type of evaluation is more frequent among older 
member states, the six oldest ones in particular, than in new member states. A trade-off is thus 
understood to exist between more integration, especially in the least integrated fields, and the 
continuation of enlargements (EU-25 Watch, 2006: 8, 15). 
                                                                                                                                               
alternative sources, we examined data of the Euromanifestos Project, which is based on the published 
platforms of parties vying for election in each country to the European Parliament (see 
http://www.europeanelectionstudies.net/). The pre-release of the database only covers the European 
elections between 1979 and 1999 and is thus previous to the constitutional referenda held in France and 
the Netherlands. It contains some detailed codes about party discourses in favour of or against 
constitutionalism (at the EU level, codes v2_203 and v2_204) and discourses in favour of or against 
EC/EU enlargement (codes v2_316 and v2_317). Using these variables (net percentage of discourse in 
favour of constitutionalism and net percentage of discourse in favour of enlargement), we find a positive 
correlation (r = .400***) between them. It seems, however, that these compatible visions changed after 
the rejection of the draft treaty in France and the Netherlands, according to EU-25 Watch (2006), but we 
do not know to what extent these changes also affected party platform discourses in subsequent EP 
elections. Another possible source is the data set produced by Benoit and Laver (2005) for their recent 
book on political party positions, which include several codes related to EU topics (see 
http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/ ppmd/PPMD_summary_data_GUIDE.pdf). This last data set, 
however, is similar to the one used in this investigation, as it is based on expert judgement about party 
positions on a number of issues. While EU-25 Watch (2006) has the advantage, for our investigation, of 
focusing on EU issues in particular and being elaborated by EU specialists, the PPMD data set has the 
advantage of a common coding scheme that allows running comparative quantitative analysis. 
7 This is the case in Croatia (p. 33), Cyprus (p. 36), Germany (pp. 53, 55), Lithuania (p. 74), the 
Netherlands (p. 81), Romania (p. 90) and Slovenia (p. 96). Even in Turkey, debates during referendum 
campaigns in France and the Netherlands “led to the general feeling that the constitutional crisis would be 
used to exclude Turkey from the EU” (p. 101). IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN DEEPENING AND WIDENING? | 9 
 
Among older member states, the report frequently refers to arguments that link so-called 
‘enlargement fatigue’ to the constitutional crisis caused by the rejection of the European 
Constitution in the French and Dutch referenda. In France, e.g., the “Polish plumber” debate, 
which emerged during the May 2005 referendum campaign, is a clear sign of the extent to 
which enlargement was blamed for the negative economic situation in France. As EU-25 Watch 
(2006: 50-51) reports, the negative outcome was the result of deep dissatisfaction among the 
French with the present-day EU, especially regarding “past and future enlargements”. As French 
Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin declared when examining the roots of the crisis: “Europe 
is suffering an identity crisis…Citizens are unclear about the geographical 
contours...membership must not be the only solution proposed to neighbouring countries...we 
must recognise today that we did not adequately prepare the ground for this enlargement, 
neither on the economic nor the political plane.”
8 
In the Netherlands, concerns may have been slightly different, having more to do with the 
financing of enlargement and the debate about the country’s role in an enlarged EU, but the 
consequences have been similar. Hence, EU-25 Watch (2006: 81) makes reference to “fears of 
migration and the future accession of Turkey” as key to explaining the negative vote. 
Looking at other founding member states, we see similar arguments. Germany, traditionally 
considered a “driver” of enlargement (Schimmelfennig, 2003; Rachman, 2006), also suffers 
‘enlargement fatigue’. In contrast to the past, when Germany always defended the compatibility 
of deepening and widening, it is now common to see leaders such as Angela Merkel making a 
negative linkage between deepening and widening, attributing the negative votes in France and 
the Netherlands to enlargement, calling for the EU to define its “final borders” and making the 
case for a “No” to Turkey’s accession.
9 As the report concludes, the debate in Germany is now 
characterised by discussion about overstretching and the need to find alternatives to it (EU-25 
Watch, 2006: 53, 112).  
In Italy, among the causes for the crisis, the report highlights “the growing fears related to the 
recent enlargement”, which were also mentioned by political leaders such as Foreign Minister 
Fini and widely cited by the mass media (EU-25 Watch, 2006: 68). In Austria, the survey 
stresses, “the reasons for the negative votes on the constitution have been mainly put down to 
the rapid implementation of the enlargement project” (EU-25 Watch, 2006: 21). The Belgium 
survey, meanwhile, reports widespread belief that “for the most part, the French referendum has 
been decided on the enlargement”, while Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt is quoted as 
affirming that “the reflection period should be the occasion to make some clear choices, choices 
that have not been made in the past. More in particular a choice has to be made between a strong 
political Europe or nothing more than a free trade area” (EU-25 Watch, 2006: 25-26).  
The situation is different among newer member states. In Spain, support for integration goes 
hand in hand with support for enlargement. In Portugal, most European analysts understand that 
the constitutional crisis would have a direct negative effect on the prospect for future EU 
enlargements. Yet, in both Portugal and Spain, there is consensus across the political spectrum 
in favour of continuing the enlargement process despite the consequences that it will have on 
both countries (reduced structural funds, increased migratory flows, industrial relocation and 
disinvestment, trade competition in key markets, etc.) (EU-25 Watch, 2006: 138, 144).  
                                                 
8 Keynote speech by French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin at the conference “The Sound of 
Europe”, Salzburg, 27 January 2006 
(http://www.eu2006.at/en/News/Speeches_Interviews/2701villepin.html).  
9 See, e.g., Angela Merkel’s statement to the Bundestag on 11 May 2006: “We cannot take on board all 
countries seeking membership…There is no question about that”. European Policy Statement by Federal 
Chancellor Angela Merkel in the German Bundestag. RegierungOnline (http://www.bundesregierung.de).  10 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
Even in newer member states, EU-25 Watch (2006) stresses how elites are aware of the 
arguments that these two policies are incompatible, although they do not share this idea of a 
trade-off or, if they do, it is to a much lesser extent than elites in older member states. In 
Estonia, the report attributes the failures in the ratification process largely to fears related to 
enlargement (EU-25 Watch, 2006: 46): “disaffection with the 2004 enlargement – the accession 
of ten new members with a liberal economic outlook, preferring English to French, has reduced 
the role of old members, especially France, as the ‘honour, reason and conscience’ of Europe; 
perception of the services directive as a threat to Western Europe protectionist social systems; 
old members have fears about the ‘competitive advantages’ of new members, such as lower 
taxes and less developed social systems; fears about future enlargement and promises issued to 
Turkey that enormously amplify the other two sets of fears”, a view that is basically the same in 
Lithuania (EU-25 Watch, 2006: 74). In Romania, President Basescu stated “that the rejection of 
the constitution in France and the Netherlands was determined firstly by the fears of the public 
in both countries to continue to financially contribute to the enlargement of Europe” (EU-25 
Watch, 2006: 90). Some newer and prospective member states are rather worried about the 
negative impact that the failure to ratify the [“a”?] constitution would have on further 
enlargement.
10 Do citizens perceive a trade-off between deepening and widening?  
In order to measure citizens’ views on the compatibility of deepening and widening, we select 
the items “support for a constitution” and “support for enlargement” from Eurobarometer 62 
(2004).
11 Though the latter indicator might be clear, we acknowledge that the former might not 
be perfect. Eurobarometer does not specifically ask citizens about their preferences regarding 
“deepening”, which leaves few options. But after the negative referenda in France and the 
Netherlands and the public debate about the Constitutional Treaty and the future of the 
European integration process, we consider that the item “support for a constitution” might well 
capture the “deepening” preferences of European citizens. All in all, the item is salient, has a 
clear political meaning, and represents a concrete entity that most people have at least heard of 
by now. 
Considering the content of elite discourses presented in the previous section, a first surprise in 
the data offered by Eurobarometer 62 (2004) is that, contrary to widespread expectations, we do 
not observe a trade-off between deepening and widening (Figure 6).
12 If we take “support for a 
European Constitution” as an indicator of ‘deepening’ and ‘support for future (further) 
enlargement’ as an indicator of ‘widening’, the Pearson’s correlation between these two 
variables shows a positive correlation of r = .258 (statistically significant at 0.01 level) within 
the EU-15 (r = .256 within the EU-25).
13 That is, those citizens who support a constitution for 
the European Union also tend to support future enlargement, while those who oppose further 
                                                 
10 See, for example, EU-25 Watch reports for Poland (2006: 134-5); Slovenia (2006: 94); Croatia (2006: 
109); and Estonia (2006: 117). 
11 This is not, however, an optimal solution. When trying to measure abstract or complicated concepts 
such as deepening and widening, the best option is to have a broad range of different indicators for each 
(latent) dimension. This would have required the design and administration of a specific survey. Since 
this was not feasible, we opted for the second-best strategy of selecting two specific policies that most 
respondents have heard of and understand (support for a European Constitution and support for 
enlargement). 
12 Eurobarometer 62 (2004) fieldwork, performed in September-October 2004, coincided with the signing 
of the European Constitution and preceded the French and Dutch referenda held in May-June 2005. 
13 We used the transformed dummy variables for the analysis (values 0-1), and attributed missing values. 
Cases were weighted by EU-15 and EU-25. Results using a non-parametric method (Kendall Tau b) are 
almost coincident: r = .256 and r = .255, respectively. The tau_b correlation with original variables 
(recoded as 1 = do not support; 2 = don’t know; 3 = support), produced a correlation of r = .278. IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN DEEPENING AND WIDENING? | 11 
 
enlargement also tend to be against a constitution. In general terms, if we take the EU-25 as a 
whole, citizens do not see a trade-off between deeper integration and further enlargement, i.e. 
there is no negative correlation between these two variables.
14 Furthermore, it seems that in the 
public’s opinion the idea of a trade-off between deepening and widening did not have much 
relevance even in the case of Turkey. Although the elite repeatedly mentioned opposition to 
Turkey’s membership as a reason for constitutional opposition in France and the Netherlands, 
survey analyses do not confirm this (Ruiz-Jiménez & Torreblanca, 2007: 1). 
Figure 6. Support for deepening and widening in EU member states 
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respectively). 
Source: EB62(2004). 
However, the relation between these two variables is a little bit more complicated and changes 
on a country by country basis (Table 1 and Figure 7).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 It is possible that the correlation is overestimated owing to both indicators being part of the same 
battery of questions. There exists some evidence showing that batteries of questions, especially long ones, 
tend to over-represent the congruence among items because of the cognitive attention demanded from the 
interviewees. In our case the effect might be minimised because the battery is not too long while the items 
selected are well known by the general public and do not demand deep cognitive attention of 
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Table 1. Relation between public support for a European Constitution and public support for 
future enlargement (row percentages) 
Future Enlargements 
COUNTRIES   For DK  Against 
For  53.8% 3.5% 42.7% 
DK 21.4%  30.4%  48.2% 
European Constitution 
Against  29.4% 4.8% 65.9% 
BELGIUM 
Total  48.8% 5.2% 46.0% 
For  61.5% 4.3% 34.1% 
DK 32.8%  33.8%  33.3% 
European Constitution 
Against  26.4% 6.3% 67.3% 
DENMARK 
Total 43.4%  10.9%  45.7% 
For  40.7% 5.2% 54.0% 
DK 16.9%  25.3%  57.8% 
European Constitution 
Against  18.7% 2.2% 79.1% 
GERMANY WEST 
Total  36.0% 6.5% 57.6% 
For  44.5% 4.3% 51.2% 
DK 23.1%  34.6%  42.3% 
European Constitution 
Against  15.2% 3.0% 81.8% 
GERMANY EAST 
Total  39.6% 5.7% 54.7% 
For  73.5% 6.2% 20.4% 
DK 34.4%  42.6%  23.0% 
European Constitution 
Against  36.5% 6.0% 57.5% 
GREECE 
Total 61.3%  10.6%  28.1% 
For  79.0% 8.6% 12.4% 
DK 31.1%  59.3%  9.6% 
European Constitution 
Against  39.7% 8.8% 51.5% 
SPAIN 
Total 66.0%  16.9%  17.1% 
For  52.7% 2.7% 44.6% 
DK 26.3%  19.7%  53.9% 
European Constitution 
Against  30.6% 1.5% 68.0% 
FINLAND 
Total  43.3% 3.6% 53.1% 
For  48.5% 7.5% 44.0% 
DK 17.6%  38.4%  44.0% 
European Constitution 
Against  15.1% 3.4% 81.6% 
FRANCE 
Total 38.8%  10.6%  50.6% 
For 67.3%  10.5%  22.2% 
DK 25.1%  54.0%  20.9% 
European Constitution 
Against 32.8%  10.4%  56.8% 
IRELAND 
Total 51.9%  21.9%  26.2% 
For  75.4% 8.9% 15.6% 
DK 20.3%  53.1%  26.6% 
European Constitution 
Against  41.2% 8.4% 50.4% 
ITALY 
Total 64.1%  14.4%  21.5% 
For  44.8% 6.0% 49.2% 
DK 18.2%  31.8%  50.0% 
European Constitution 
Against  15.3% 1.4% 83.3% 
LUXEMBOURG 
Total  38.2% 7.6% 54.2% 
For  57.8% 6.5% 35.7% 
DK 24.2%  29.0%  46.8% 
European Constitution 
Against  28.8% 2.9% 68.3% 
NETHERLANDS 
Total  49.9% 7.1% 43.0% 
For  40.5% 8.1% 51.4% 
DK 9.9%  30.2%  59.9% 
European Constitution 
Against  16.7% 4.0% 79.3% 
AUSTRIA 
Total 30.3%  11.3%  58.4% 
For  68.0% 5.7% 26.3% 
DK 23.2%  52.1%  24.8% 
European Constitution 
Against  20.7% 4.5% 74.8% 
PORTUGAL 
Total 48.8%  20.0%  31.2% IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN DEEPENING AND WIDENING? | 13 
 
For  56.6% 8.9% 34.5% 
DK 38.8%  20.5%  40.7% 
European Constitution 
Against  22.7% 7.7% 69.6% 
SWEDEN 
Total 43.6%  11.6%  44.8% 
For  70.1% 5.6% 24.4% 
DK 33.2%  41.7%  25.1% 
European Constitution 
Against  28.4% 5.0% 66.6% 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Total 50.0%  13.0%  37.0% 
For  75.6% 7.6% 16.9% 
DK 42.1%  40.8%  17.1% 
European Constitution 
Against 33.3%  11.8%  54.9% 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
Total 59.9%  16.7%  23.4% 
For 70.2%  11.3%  18.5% 
DK 27.8%  68.1%  4.2% 
European Constitution 
Against  32.1% 8.9% 58.9% 
CYPRUS (S) 
Total 59.8%  19.2%  21.0% 
For  78.9% 8.2% 12.9% 
DK 35.3%  53.9%  10.8% 
European Constitution 
Against  49.7% 9.6% 40.6% 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
Total 65.6%  17.1%  17.3% 
For  72.2% 8.8% 19.0% 
DK 43.6%  38.3%  18.0% 
European Constitution 
Against 39.8%  10.2%  50.0% 
ESTONIA 
Total 61.1%  16.8%  22.1% 
For  78.7% 6.6% 14.8% 
DK 27.0%  62.6%  10.4% 
European Constitution 
Against 45.2%  11.6%  43.2% 
HUNGARY 
Total 62.4%  16.8%  20.8% 
For  76.4% 9.6% 14.0% 
DK 40.6%  41.7%  17.8% 
European Constitution 
Against  49.2% 9.8% 41.0% 
LATVIA 
Total 63.3%  18.4%  18.3% 
For 86.4%  7.3%  6.3% 
DK 43.0%  51.1%  5.9% 
European Constitution 
Against 62.0%  18.0%  20.0% 
LITHUANIA 
Total 75.0%  18.2%  6.9% 
For  81.0% 8.6% 10.4% 
DK 40.9%  50.0%  9.1% 
European Constitution 
Against 29.0%  20.0%  51.0% 
MALTA 
Total 60.0%  21.8%  18.2% 
For 86.3%  5.3%  8.4% 
DK 44.1%  45.3%  10.6% 
European Constitution 
Against 66.4%  13.3%  20.4% 
POLAND 
Total 76.9%  13.0%  10.1% 
For  80.5% 6.9% 12.6% 
DK 33.5%  51.9%  14.6% 
European Constitution 
Against 43.8%  12.4%  43.8% 
SLOVAKIA 
Total 67.7%  15.9%  16.4% 
For  81.9% 4.4% 13.7% 
DK 43.4%  41.9%  14.7% 
European Constitution 
Against 55.1%  11.6%  33.3% 
SLOVENIA 
Total  75.1% 9.7% 15.2% 
Notes: Chi square is statistically significant for each country at 0.01 level. Cases weighted by target. 
Source: EB62(2004). 
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Figure 7. Support for deepening and widening, country by country 
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Note: Original variables were used. No missing values assigned. Cases weighted by target. 
Sources: EB62(2004). 
As already noted, in most countries, citizens who oppose a constitution are also against 
enlargement, while those who support either of the two are likely to also support the other. Yet 
there are some small variations worth noting. First, there are three countries in which most 
citizens in favour of a constitution oppose further enlargement; these are Germany, Luxembourg 
and Austria. Here we do observe tensions between deepening and widening. Additionally, in IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN DEEPENING AND WIDENING? | 15 
 
these countries, as well as in Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, citizens 
who do not have a clear position regarding a constitution (those whose answer is “don’t know”) 
have a slight/significant propensity to oppose enlargement. However, in southern European 
countries (Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal), as well as in the UK and Ireland, citizens who do 
not know about the Constitution are more inclined to answer that they also do not know about 
future enlargement.  
In contrast, looking at the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (NMS, i.e. those 
who became members in 2004), we find that the percentage of citizens who oppose a European 
Constitution but support future enlargements is higher than the percentage of those who oppose 
both or support a constitution alone. This is the pattern in the Czech Republic, Hungry, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia, but not in Estonia, where those who “don’t know” about a 
European Constitution are rather inclined to support future enlargements. 
The positive correlation between support for a European Constitution and support for future 
(further) enlargement holds for each country, although in line with the observations above, the 
relation is stronger in some of them (Table 2).  
Table 2. Symmetric measures of correlation between support for an European Constitution and 
support for future (further) enlargement 
COUNTRIES     Value  Stat. 
sign.  COUNTRIES     Value  Stat. 
sign 
Phi 0.353  0.000  Phi 0.344  0.000  BELGIUM 
Cramer V  0.250  0.000 
SWEDEN 
Cramer V  0.244  0.000 
Phi 0.488  0.000  Phi 0.605  0.000  DENMARK  Cramer V  0.345  0.000 
UNITED 
KINGDOM Cramer  V  0.428  0.000 
Phi 0.344  0.000  Phi 0.517  0.000  GERMANY 
WEST Cramer  V  0.243  0.000  N. IRELAND  Cramer V  0.366  0.000 
Phi 0.379  0.000  Phi 0.592  0.000  GERMANY 
EAST Cramer  V  0.268  0.000  CYPRUS (S)  Cramer V  0.419  0.000 
Phi 0.522  0.000  Phi 0.564  0.000  GREECE  Cramer V  0.369  0.000 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC Cramer  V  0.399  0.000 
Phi 0.609  0.000  Phi 0.409  0.000  SPAIN  Cramer V  0.431  0.000  ESTONIA  Cramer V  0.289  0.000 
Phi 0.316  0.000  Phi 0.601  0.000  FINLAND  Cramer V  0.224  0.000  HUNGARY  Cramer V  0.425  0.000 
Phi 0.445  0.000  Phi 0.430  0.000  FRANCE  Cramer V  0.315  0.000  LATVIA  Cramer V  0.304  0.000 
Phi 0.552  0.000  Phi 0.480  0.000  IRELAND  Cramer V  0.391  0.000  LITHUANIA  Cramer V  0.339  0.000 
Phi 0.525  0.000  Phi 0.607  0.000  ITALY  Cramer V  0.371  0.000  MALTA  Cramer V  0.429  0.000 
Phi 0.363  0.000  Phi 0.450  0.000  LUXEMBOURG  Cramer V  0.257  0.000  POLAND  Cramer V  0.319  0.000 
Phi 0.341  0.000  Phi 0.516  0.000  NETHERLANDS  Cramer V  0.241  0.000  SLOVAKIA  Cramer V  0.365  0.000 
Phi 0.313  0.000  Phi 0.455  0.000  AUSTRIA  Cramer V  0.221  0.000  SLOVENIA  Cramer V  0.322  0.000 
Phi 0.616  0.000        PORTUGAL  Cramer V  0.435  0.000        
Note: No missing values attributed. Cases weighted by target. 
Source: EB62(2004). 16 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
The group of countries in which the relation is weaker (Cramer V < 0.3) includes Belgium, 
Germany West and East, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden.
 15 We can 
also include France in this group, because although its Cramer V is slightly over 0.3, it shares all 
other group characteristics. In all these countries, support for a European Constitution is clear: 
around, or above, two-thirds of the population in Belgium, Germany (East and West) 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and France support it; over 50% in Austria and Finland; and 50% 
in Sweden.  
Therefore, positions on whether widening and deepening are complementary or rival vary 
widely. Citizens from the first and second enlargements (United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal) as well as the 10 NMS are not inclined to see them in terms of 
trade-off: percentages of support for one are similar to percentages of support for the other; 
whereas citizens from older member states and the Nordic 1995 enlargement tend to be sceptical 
and would rather sacrifice further enlargement (percentages of support for deepening are 
significantly higher than percentages of support for enlargement) (see Figure 8).  
Figure 8. Support for deepening and support for widening of the EU  
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3.  Fears of and support for deepening and widening 
What are citizens’ reasons for opposing either the Union’s deepening or widening? To what 
extent do they mirror the arguments in public discourses presented above? Are fears of building 
Europe a reason for not supporting either an European Constitution or future enlargement? Are 
those who fear a transfer of jobs to other countries with lower labour costs less supportive of 
enlargement? Are those who fear the loss of national identity and culture, or an increase in their 
contributions to the Union’s budget, less supportive of a European Constitution?  
Tables 3 and 4 show that among citizens of older member states (EU-15) the most widely feared 
of perceived Europe-building consequences are the transfer of jobs to countries with lower 
labour costs (79%), price competition’s negative impact on national agriculture (72%) and 
increased contributions to the EU budget (68%). Fear of an increase in crime and drug 
trafficking, as well as regret for the end of national currencies, rank high (66%). Among citizens 
of new member states (NMS, EU-10+), meanwhile, the most widespread fear concerns the 
possibility of an increase in drug trafficking and international crime (73%, a higher percentage 
than in older member states), followed by concerns similar to those expressed by citizens in 
older member states: the transfer of jobs (66%) and increased budget contributions (65%). 
However, except for worries about drugs and crime, citizens from newer member states are less 
worried about the negative consequences of European integration than citizens from older 
member states. Concerns about “losing national identities and cultures” do not figure among the 
causes of new member state citizens’ most widely shared fears (only 34% among the NMS-10+; 
45% among the EU-15); “national languages being used less and less” worries 35% of NMS-
10+ citizens and 42% of EU-15 citizens. However, in other studies different aspects of this so-
called ‘identity dimension’ has shown to play a much more relevant role (Ruiz-Jiménez & 
Torreblanca, 2007). We do not have data, therefore it is difficult to figure out how the 
perception that “cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are too large” (used in EB64.2) 
would translate into a fear of “losing national culture and identities” or a fear of “national 
language being used less and less” (EB62). It is also possible that “identity” concerns increased 
between 2004 (EB62) and 2005 (EB64.2). 
Table 3. Fears of building the EU (percentages of citizens who fear possible consequences) 
   EU-15  EU-10+  CC-4 
Small states’ loss of power  47.6%  50.1% 45.9% 
Drug trafficking and crime  66.3%  72.7% 61.4% 
National language used less  42.3%  35.4% 50.6% 
Paying more to the EU  68.8%  65.2% 53.2% 
Losing social benefits  57.0%  44.4% 34.2% 
Losing national identity-culture  44.8%  34.3% 45.6% 
Economic crisis  55.9%  49.7% 38.0% 
Transfer of jobs  78.8%  66.3% 51.0% 
Hurting national farmers  71.9%  60.8% 58.4% 
End of national currency*  66.3%  53.8% 56.1% 
* Question not posed in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. Missing values attributed. Cases weighted as indicated in 
columns. 
Source: EB62(2004). 
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Table 4. Fears of building the EU, by country (percentages of citizens who fear possible consequences) 
  Power small 
states 
Drugs and 
crime 
Language 
used less 
Paying 
more 
Loss social 
benefits 
Loss nat. 
identity  Econ. crisis Transfer 
jobs 
Harm nat. 
farmers 
End 
currency 
BELGIUM  53.49 71.05 41.17 69.71 58.83 35.83 58.62 84.29 80.18  - 
DENMARK  56.61 63.52 39.11 55.93 48.35 41.44 29.38 71.40 54.96 50.10 
GERMANY  WEST  19.96 71.65 43.68 70.40 61.72 36.74 55.45 86.21 69.53  - 
GERMANY  EAST  24.41 74.61 48.82 70.67 71.06 39.37 56.50 85.24 66.34  - 
GREECE  53.10 62.20 51.30 68.00 49.50 47.90 61.00 82.90 76.90  - 
SPAIN  49.56 55.72 39.39 64.32 55.52 42.03 55.13 68.52 72.92  - 
FINLAND  78.61 81.89 41.89 79.60 51.54 38.31 34.73 83.58 84.48  - 
FRANCE  50.10 61.96 44.61 74.51 65.49 41.57 58.53 89.41 81.67  - 
IRELAND  57.60 74.40 51.00 60.10 44.90 58.90 35.70 78.80 59.40 74.00 
ITALY  55.00 60.49 45.98 63.92 46.96 43.82 66.08 69.80 63.73  - 
LUXEMBOURG  56.18 79.48 66.53 66.14 55.98 49.20 52.59 82.87 75.50  - 
NETHERLANDS  57.58 60.26 39.35 65.41 66.50 39.25 40.83 77.70 78.59  - 
AUSTRIA  51.84 74.18 35.95 73.09 59.48 44.69 58.49 79.94 67.23  - 
PORTUGAL  59.50 76.20 42.60 66.10 65.90 48.40 68.40 81.30 79.90  - 
SWEDEN  53.90 76.70 33.10 67.10 39.80 26.00 33.30 79.90 64.70 45.80 
UNITED  KINGDOM  58.75 71.61 36.30 71.41 52.23 65.68 53.02 73.29 71.02 64.79 
NORTHERN  IRELAND  59.20 77.93 36.45 66.22 57.53 57.19 54.52 74.25 64.21 53.18 
CYPRUS  (S)  47.60 81.40 43.80 66.60 43.80 47.80 75.80 59.40 81.40 47.00 
CZECH  REPUBLIC  61.21 75.72 44.47 62.51 45.12 39.72 53.58 74.70 77.67 55.91 
ESTONIA  47.90 68.17 51.20 64.30 30.00 40.50 38.80 54.30 56.80 57.60 
HUNGARY  59.07 71.50 32.35 62.92 41.91 32.94 49.51 77.32 77.71 58.68 
LATVIA  46.07 72.04 49.25 75.62 39.90 42.89 55.92 55.62 75.42 58.51 
LITHUANIA  36.09 69.06 44.61 53.24 31.24 40.08 39.48 49.15 55.73 47.96 
MALTA  47.40 55.40 34.80 54.20 48.40 33.20 52.40 65.20 55.20 45.00 
POLAND  45.80 72.20 30.00 67.00 45.00 30.20 49.00 64.10 48.30 53.70 
SLOVAKIA  53.43 76.92 39.54 64.38 52.00 42.01 50.48 60.62 74.76 51.04 
SLOVENIA  49.00 70.10 53.30 70.07 60.06 42.64 51.60 74.00 76.10 31.50 
  (Mean)  51.80 70.27 42.68 66.56 51.00 42.11 50.70 73.37 70.27 54.21 
Source: EB62(2004). IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN DEEPENING AND WIDENING? | 19 
 
According to the data in Table 6, fears related to the building of Europe are a reason to oppose 
both deepening and widening. But it is surprising to learn how limited their impact is. These 
fears are not a very important reason to oppose either deepening or widening; they explain less 
than 10% of the variability in support for a European Constitution and for future enlargement of 
the EU-25. Further analyses (whose results are not shown here) reveal  that these fears are 
associated more with the globalisation process in general than with the process of European 
integration in particular. That is, these problems are not thought of as the consequences of 
European integration (they are thought of as consequences of globalisation), thus they do not 
constitute a reason for opposing European integration (deepening or widening). Moreover, it 
might be the case that the EU is thought of as a means of protection against the dangers posed 
by globalisation. In this case, we would find positive signs in the regressions shown in Table 5. 
Quite interestingly, we observe that fears of jobs being transferred to other member countries do 
not negatively affect support for a European Constitution. To the contrary, those across the EU-
15 who fear that building the EU might transfer jobs to countries with lower production costs 
are in fact more supportive of a European Constitution. However, among citizens from older 
member states, fears of job losses do have (negative) consequences on support for future 
enlargements.
16 
Table 5. Fears of building the EU and support for a European Constitution and future 
enlargement (logistic regression) 
Support European Constitution  Support future enlargement 
   EU-25 EU-15  EU-10+  EU-25 EU-15  EU-10+ 
Small states’ power  -0.269*** -0.280*** -0.403***  0.282***  0.284***  -0.373*** 
Drugs and crime  -0.111** -0.129**  ns  -0.280***  -0.430*** ns 
Language used less  0.077* ns 0.156*  -0.135***  -0.142***  ns 
Paying more  -0.403*** -0.461***  -0.137* -0.442***  -0.552*** ns 
Loss social benefits  ns ns ns  -0.131***  -0.088*  ns 
Loss national identity  -0.645***  -0.666***  -0.423***  -0.215*** -0.150*** -0.241*** 
Economic crisis  -0.146*** -0.147**  -0.131*  ns  ns -0.316*** 
Transfer of jobs  0.145** 0.215***  ns  -0.423***  -0.390***  ns 
National farmers  ns ns  -0.237**  -0.036***  ns  -0.192** 
End nat. currency  -0.17***6 -0.208***  ns  -0.456***  -0.460*** ns 
Constant  2.146***  2.112***  2.276***  1.666*** 1.514*** 2.204*** 
R square Nagelkerke  .062 .067 .041  .095  .102  .039 
N  23796  14469  9327  2376 14469 9327 
* Significant at 0.05 level; ** significant at 0.01 level; *** significant at 0.001 level. 
Notes:  Missing values attributed. Cases weighted as indicated in columns. Cell entries are beta 
coefficients of logistic binary regressions. Values of coefficients are not comparable within the same 
regression. 
Source: EB62(2004). 
A number of feared consequences have a negative impact on support for enlargement only 
among citizens from the EU-15: increase in drug trafficking and international crime, decrease in 
national language use, increase in national contributions to the EU, loss of social benefits and 
jobs transferred to member countries with lower labour costs. On the other hand, fears of an 
economic crisis and of national farmers suffering economically have a negative impact on 
                                                 
16 This could mean citizens perceive that having a constitution might help member states counter 
delocalisation effects, or, alternatively, that they are willing to accept losing jobs to new member states as 
part of the price of political union. Unfortunately, available data cannot settle this question.   20 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
support for future enlargements only among EU-10+ citizens. Among the variables with a 
negative impact are those related to identity fears, although their contribution is modest 
compared to the impact of the so-called ‘identity dimension’ on citizen opposition to Turkey’s 
membership in particular (Ruiz-Jiménez & Torreblanca, 2007). Divergences in the items used in 
different surveys make it quite difficult to explain our general finding on reasons for opposing 
further enlargement in general (using EB62) relative to our finding on reasons for opposing 
Turkey’s membership in particular (using EB64.2). However, in a broad sense, our results are 
not contradictory. Regarding Turkey, we hypothesised that the “more the identity dimension 
figures in public debate…the more probable it is that support will be low”, according to which 
our finding indicates that identity-related fears were not very strong or widely shared; from that 
point of view, if those fears increase, we can further hypothesise that negative attitudes towards 
Turkey’s accession could even worsen. It is not surprising either that the ‘identity dimension’ 
will be more salient when interviewees are confronted with a specific country (particularly in 
the case of Turkey, which is more or less well known by all of them) than when they are asked 
in an abstract way (without a clear cultural reference) about further enlargement. 
Summarising the findings in Table 5, fears of what the building of the EU might entail have a 
greater impact on widening (support for enlargement) than on deepening (support for a 
European Constitution). Older member states, however, are unique in that fears of the 
consequences of integration lead their citizens to support more integration and to be more 
opposed to further expansion.  
This is congruent with the hypothesis that the idea of a trade-off between these two policies was 
shared by a higher percentage of citizens only among older member states. In fact, when the 
variable “country” is introduced into the model, it becomes a key to explaining citizen support 
for deepening and widening.
17 Therefore, we have run different regressions in each country to 
test the effect of fears on national support for a European Constitution and future enlargements 
(Tables 6 and 7). 
Table 6 shows the results regarding support for a European Constitution. The fear of small states 
losing power is the variable that most negatively affects support for a European Constitution in 
a group of nine countries, both older and newer member states, most of which are small.
18 Fears 
of paying more to the Union have a negative impact on eight countries, seven of them older 
member states.
19 A similar effect is observed in relation to fears of losing social benefits, which 
has a significant impact in eight countries, six of them older member states.
20 In a similar way, 
fears of an economic crisis are significant in seven countries, only one of them a newer member 
state.
21 
                                                 
17 Now, in older member states (EU-15), the model explains 13% of the variance in support for a 
European Constitution and 20% of the variance in support for future enlargements. In newer member 
states (EU-10+) the variance explained an increase to 8% regarding support for a European Constitution 
and 7% regarding support for enlargement.  
18 Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Estonia are the small countries and the Czech 
Republic is a medium size country. 
19 Belgium, Greece, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom are the older 
member states, and the Czech Republic is a newer one. 
20 Denmark, Germany East, Greece, Austria, Portugal and Sweden are the older member states, and the 
Czech Republic and Malta are the newer member states. 
21 Germany West, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland and Austria are the older member states and the Czech 
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Table 6. Fears of building the EU and support for a European Constitution, by country (Beta 
coefficients of logistic regressions; read in files; independent variables in columns) 
  Small 
states 
Drugs/ 
crime 
Lang-
uage 
Paying 
more 
Social 
benefits 
Nat. 
identity 
Econ. 
crisis 
Transfer 
jobs  Farmers  Nat. 
currency
BELGIUM
1  ns ns ns  -.621*  ns ns ns ns ns ni 
DENMARK
2 -.606*  ns  ns  ns  -
.555***  ns ns ns ns ns 
GERMANY W.
3 ns  ns  -.464*  ns  ns  -.497  -
.811***  +.640* ns  ni 
GERMANY E.
4  ns  -.931*  ns ns  +.801  -.686  ns ns ns ni 
GREECE
5  ns  ns  ns -.535*  -.449* ns  -
.727***  ns -.527 ni 
SPAIN
6  ns ns ns ns ns ns  -.656**  +.483*  ns ni 
FINLAND
7  -.521**  ns ns  -.317*  ns ns ns ns ns ni 
FRANCE
8  ns ns ns ns ns  -
.778***  -.570** ns  ns  ni 
IRELAND
9  -.386*  +.603**  ns ns ns ns  +.423*  ns ns ni 
ITALY
10  ns ns ns  -.656**  ns ns ns  +.548**  ns ni 
LUXEMBOURG
11  - - - - - - - - -  ni 
NETHERLANDS
12  -.350*  ns ns  -.459*  ns ns ns ns ns ni 
AUSTRIA
13  ns ns ns ns  -.650*  ns  -.658  ns ns ni 
PORTUGAL
14 ns  ns  -.460  ns  -.772**  ns  ns  -.871**  +.856**  ni 
SWEDEN
15 -.463**  ns  +.537**  -.459*  -
.589***  ns ns ns ns ns 
UK
6 ns  ns  ns  -
.864***  ns -.518** ns  ns  ns  -
.739*** 
N. IRELAND
17  ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 
CYPRUS
18  ns ns ns ns ns  -1.069*  ns ns ns  -.743** 
CZECH REP.C
19 -.557**  ns  ns  ns  -.339* -
.666***  ns ns ns ns 
ESTONIA
20  -.532**  ns ns ns ns ns  -.653**  ns ns ns 
HUNGARY
21  ns  -.438*  ns  -.473*  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
LATVIA
22  ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns  -.434* 
LITHUANIA
23  - - - - - - - - - - 
MALTA
24  -.682* ns -.597* ns  -.929**  ns  ns  ns  ns  -.759 
POLAND
25  ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 
SLOVAKIA
26  - - - - - - - - - - 
SLOVENIA
27  -.593*  ns ns ns ns  -.772**  ns ns ns ns 
1.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.76. N = 974. Constant 2.747***. 
2.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.172. N = 1028. Constant 1.416***. 
3.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.115. N = 1037. Constant 2.468***. 
4.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.100. N = 508. Constant  2.898***. 
5.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.120. N = 1000. Constant 2.482***. 
6.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.044. N = 1023. Constant 1.923***. 
7.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.029. N = 1005. Constant 1.037***. 
8.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.088. N = 1020. Constant 2.381***. 
9.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.046. N = 1000. Constant 2.001***. 
10.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.051. N = 1020. Constant 1.773***. 
11.  N = 502. Regression results were over the confidence interval of 90%. 
12.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.053. N = 1009. Constant 2.349***. 
13.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.067. N = 1007. Constant 1.875***. 
14.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.065. N = 1000. Constant 2.049***. 
15.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.114. N = 1000. Constant 1.427***. 
16.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.160. N = 1001. Constant 2.031***. 
17.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.156. N = 299. Constant 3.002***. 22 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
18.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.132. N = 500. Constant 3.186***. 
19.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.060. N = 1069. Constant 1.469***. 
20.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.057. N = 1000. Constant 2.138***. 
21.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.062. N = 1014. Constant 1.709***. 
22.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.045. N = 1005. Constant 2.292***. 
23.  N = 1002. Regression results were over the confidence interval of 90%. 
24.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.292. N = 500. Constant 2.645***. 
25.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.0r0. N = 1000. Constant 2.602***. 
26.  N = 1237. Regression results were over the confidence interval of 90%. 
27.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.059. N = 1000. Constant 2.567***. 
* Significant at 0.05 level; ** significant at 0.01 level; *** significant at 0.001 level. 
Notes: Missing values attributed. Cases weighted by target. 
Cell entries are beta coefficient of logistic binary regressions. Values of coefficients are not comparable 
within the same regression. 
Source: EB62(2004). 
Table 7 shows that the configuration of fears that have an impact on support for enlargement is 
different across countries. Among the variables that show a negative impact on support for 
future enlargement in a higher number of EU countries, we find the fear of increased 
contributions to the EU budget. The negative impact occurs exclusively among older member 
states, and it is a recurrent subject of argument among all net contributors to the EU budget.
22 
Out of eight countries in which there is a significant negative impact, only Greece and Finland 
are not net contributors. Fears of jobs being transferred to other member countries with lower 
labour costs also have a negative impact in more older member states (five)
23 than newer ones 
(only Hungary). Two factors that exert an impact on many countries include the fear of losing 
social benefits and fears of an increase in drug trafficking and international crime. Though we 
found some newer member states in this group (Malta and Slovenia), the negative impact on 
support for enlargement of social or welfare concerns is most widespread in older member 
states.
24 Fears of small states losing power and fear of losing national identity and culture have 
an impact on as many older as newer member states.  
It is possible that some negative expectations about the future are accepted as events that will 
happen no matter what policies the EU follows; therefore, they are not grounds for opposing 
either deepening or widening (unless, of course, one does not support the concept of an EU at 
all). As already said, some fears are associated more with the globalisation process in general 
than with the process of European integration in particular. That is, these problems are not 
thought of as the consequences of the process of European integration (they are thought of as a 
consequence of globalisation), therefore they do not constitute a valid reason for opposing 
European integration (deepening or widening). It might even be the case that the EU is thought 
of as a protective influence against dangers posed by the globalisation process. This would 
explain both the little explicative power of fears over support for deepening and widening and 
several of the positive signs in the regressions. 
 
 
                                                 
22 United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden. 
23 Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Austria. 
24 Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Northern Ireland. IS THERE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN DEEPENING AND WIDENING? | 23 
 
Table 7. Fears of building the EU and support for future enlargements, by country (Beta 
coefficients of logistic regressions; read in files; independent variables in columns) 
  Small 
states 
Drugs/ 
crime 
Lang-
uage 
Paying 
more 
Social 
benefits 
Nat. 
identity 
Econ. 
crisis 
Transfer 
jobs  Farmers  Nat. 
currency
BELGIUM
1  -
.494***  -.397*  ns ns ns ns ns  -.459*  ns ns 
DENMARK
2  -.391** -.479** -.479** -.525**  ns  ns  ns  -.482  ns  ns 
GERMANY W.
3 +.438*  -.424**  -.438**  -
.628***  ns ns ns ns ns ni 
GERMANY E.
4  ns ns ns  -.760**  ns ns ns ns ns ni 
GREECE
5  ns ns ns  -.636**  ns ns  -.528**  ns ns ni 
SPAIN
6  ns  -.578**  -.495*  ns  +.518**  ns ns ns ns ni 
FINLAND
7 ns  ns  ns  -.551**  -
.571***  +.525** ns  ns  ns  ni 
FRANCE
8 ns  -
.657***  ns -.504** ns  -.388*  ns -.809** ns  ni 
IRELAND
9  ns +.373*  -.363** ns -.534** ns  ns  ns  ns  ni 
ITALY
10  ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ni 
LUXEMBOURG
11  ns  -.712**  ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ni 
NETHERLANDS
12 -.351*  ns  ns  -
.796***  -.310* ns  ns  -.494**  ns  ni 
AUSTRIA
13  ns ns ns  -.756**  ns ns ns  -.645**  -.508*  ni 
PORTUGAL
14  ns ns ns ns  -.482**  -.503**  ns ns  +.452*  ni 
SWEDEN
15 ns  -
.579***  ns  -.410*  -.348*  -.363*  ns ns ns ns 
UNITED 
KINGDOM
16  ns ns ns 
-
1.036**
* 
ns -.491** ns  ns  ns -.541** 
N. IRELAND
17  ns ns ns ns  -
.1081**  ns ns ns ns  -.776* 
CYPRUS
18  ns ns ns ns  +.673**  ns ns ns ns  -.677** 
CZECH REP.C
19  ns ns  -.464**  ns ns  -.339**  ns ns ns ns 
ESTONIA
20  -
.714***  ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 
HUNGARY
21 -.384*  -.511**  ns  ns  ns  -.388  -
.670***  -.676** ns  ns 
LATVIA
22  -.439**  ns ns ns ns ns  -.460*  ns ns ns 
LITHUANIA
23  - - - - - - - - - - 
MALTA
24  ns  -.629*  ns ns  -.683*  ns ns ns ns ns 
POLAND
25  - - - - - - - - - - 
SLOVAKIA
26  -.533**  ns ns ns ns  -.361*  -.338*  ns ns ns 
SLOVENIA
27  ns ns ns ns  -.447  ns ns ns ns  -.359* 
1.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.077. N = 974. Constant 1.322***. 
2.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.172. N = 1028. Constant 1.288***. 
3.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.107. N = 1037. Constant 0.628**. 
4.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.125. N = 508. Constant 0.935**. 
5.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.101. N = 1000. Constant 1.082***. 
6.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.055. N = 1023. Constant 1.671***. 
7.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.073. N = 1005. Constant  0.676***. 
8.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.139. N = 1020. Constant 1.350***. 
9.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.058. N = 1000. Constant 1.171***. 
10.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.026. N = 1020. Constant 1.186***. 
11.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.094. N = 502. Constant 1.166***. 
12.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.142. N = 1009. Constant 1.782***. 
13.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.130. N = 1007. Constant 0.676***. 
14.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.053. N = 1000. Constant 0.938***. 
15.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.104. N = 1000. Constant 1.020***. 24 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
16.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.180. N = 1011. Constant 1.904***. 
17.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.127. N = 299. Constant 2.223***. 
18.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.062. N = 500. Constant 1.386***. 
19.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.034. N = 1069. Constant 1.405***. 
20.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.071. N = 1000. Constant 1.812***. 
21.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.146. N = 1014. Constant 2.652***. 
22.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.037. N = 1005. Constant 1.213***. 
23.  N = 1002. Regression results were over the confidence interval of 90%. 
24.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.179. N = 500. Constant 2.539***. 
25.  N = 1000. Regression results were over the confidence interval of 90%. 
26.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.056. N = 1237. Constant 1.973***. 
27.  R square Nagelkerke = 0.041. N = 1000. Constant 2.062***. 
* Significant at 0.05 level; ** significant at 0.01 level; *** significant at 0.001 level. 
Missing values attributed. Cases weighted by target. 
Cell entries are beta coefficient of logistic binary regressions. Values of coefficients are not comparable 
within the same regression. 
Source: EB62(2004). 
A comparison of the effects of independent variables (fears of building the EU) shows that the 
fear of paying more to the EU budget affects citizen support both for a European Constitution 
and for further enlargement to a much greater degree among older member states than among 
newer member states. Also, while the fear of jobs being transferred to other countries has a 
negative impact on support for future enlargements in older member states, it also has a positive 
impact on support for a European Constitution in those same states. Fears of an increase in drug 
trafficking and international crime affect citizens’ support for enlargement in more countries 
than those in which they affect support for a European Constitution.  
4.  Fears and trade-offs: The gap between elite and public opinion 
Having established the impact of fears on support for the processes of deepening and widening, 
we explore now their effects on the perception of trade-offs between these two European 
policies. Although the perception of a trade-off between deepening and widening is not 
prevalent among citizens in EU-25 member states, such a trade-off is still perceived by more 
than one-third of the population in older member states and more than one-fifth in newer 
member states (see Table 9). This last section tries to explore the factors that make citizens 
prefer deepening over widening.  
As can be seen in Table 8, there are great differences between older and newer member states in 
relation to the number of citizens who support both, one or none of these two European policies 
of deepening and widening. Among citizens of both older and newer member states, most 
support both a European Constitution and future enlargement, but the percentage is much higher 
in newer member states. This difference is explained by the higher percentage of citizens in 
older member states (30%) who support a European Constitution but not further enlargement. 
As we have already mentioned, the tension among these two policies is more apparent among 
citizens from older member states: one out of three citizens in these countries prefer a 
constitution over enlargement.
25 
                                                 
25 Congruent with the findings above, the greatest percentages are represented by citizens who support a 
European Constitution and future enlargement at the same time, both within the EU-15 as well as the EU-
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Table 8. Trade-off between a European Constitution and future enlargement (percentage of 
citizens who choose different combinations) 
  
Constitution and 
enlargement 
No constitution and 
no enlargement 
Constitution 
exclusively 
Enlargement 
exclusively 
EU-25  51.3% 14.1%  27.2%  7.5% 
EU-15  47.3% 15.6%  30.3%  6.7% 
EU-10+  71.3% 6.3%  11.2%  11.2% 
Notes: Missing values assigned. Cases weighted as indicated in rows. 
Source: EB62 (2004). 
The following analysis compares the group of citizens who prefer the constitution over 
enlargement with those who prefer enlargement over the constitution (Table 9). A dummy 
variable, value 1, is assigned to those who express their preference for the constitution over 
enlargement, and another, 0, to those who prefer enlargement over the constitution. All other 
citizens are excluded from the analysis at this stage. Fears of building the EU remain 
independent variables, but we also introduce socio-demographic variables (ideology, 
involvement in political discussions, education, sex/gender, age, professional situation and size 
of habitat), and other variables regarding general attitudes towards, attachment to and 
knowledge about the EU. These variables are included as control variables (though we are still 
interested mainly in the effects of fears). Introducing these three subsets of variables (socio-
demographic, European attitudes and fears), we are able to explain 17% of the variance in 
preference for deepening over widening in older member states, and 13% in newer member 
states. 
Table 9. Explaining preference for a European Constitution over future enlargement (dependent 
variable) (beta coefficients and odds ratios of logistic regression) 
EU-25 EU-15  EU-10+ 
   Beta Exp(B) Beta Exp(B) Beta Exp(B)
Discuss political matters (ref. never)        
     Frequently  0.430*** 1.537 0.535** 1.708  0.476* 1.609 
     Occasionally  0.478*** 1.613 0.463*** 1.588 0.453** 1.573 
Satisfaction with life (not at all satisfied)        
     Very satisfied  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
     Fairly satisfied  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
     Not very satisfied  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Optimism re: the future (ref. get worse)        
     Improve  -0.429***  0.651 -0.626***  0.535 ns   
     Stay about the same  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Membership a good thing (ref. good)        
     Bad  0.209* 1.232  ns  ns  ns  ns 
     Neither good nor bad  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Trust national government (ref. trust)        
     Don’t trust  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
     Don’t know  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Trust the EU (ref. trust)        
     Don’t trust  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
     Don’t know  -0.402** 0.669 -0.558***  0.573 ns  ns 
For/against political union (ref. for)        
     Don’t know  -0.180* 0.835 -0.239* 0.787  ns  ns 
     Against  -0.274* 0.760  ns  ns  ns  ns 
Understand EU works (ref. understand)        
     Don’t know  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
     Don’t understand  0.676*** 1.965 1.039*** 2.827  ns  ns 26 | RUIZ-JIMÉNEZ & TORREBLANCA 
 
Knowledge about EU (inc. 1-10)  0.045* 1.046  ns  ns  ns  ns 
Attachment to nation (dec. 1-4)  ns ns ns ns  0.330**  1.391 
Attachment to EU (dec. 1-4)  ns ns ns ns ns Ns 
Ideology (left-right. 1-10)  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Age education ended  ns ns ns ns  -0.081***  0.922 
Sex (1. male; 0. female)  ns ns ns ns ns Ns 
Age (years)  0.007* 1.007  ns  ns  ns  ns 
Profession (ref. student)        
     Self-employed  0.782** 2.185 0.853* 2.346  ns  Ns 
     Manager  0.871** 2.390 0.915** 2.498 1.650* 5.205 
     Other white-collar  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
     Manual worker  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
     House person  ns ns ns ns  2.302**  9.992 
     Unemployed  0.569* 1.766  ns  ns  ns  ns 
     Retired  ns  ns  ns  ns  ns 
Size habitat (ref. large town)        
     Rural area  0.190* 1.210 0.322* 1.380  ns  ns 
     Medium size town  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Small states losing power  -0.624***  0.536 -0.665***  0.514 0.585*** 1.796 
Drug trafficking and crime  0.211* 1.235  0.374***  1.454  ns  ns 
Nat. language used less  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Paying more  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Loss of social benefits  0.317*** 1.373 0.335** 1.397  ns  ns 
Loss of national identity and culture  -0.245** 0.783 -0.384***  0.681 ns  ns 
Economic crisis  0.254** 1.289 0.239* 1.270 0.433** 1.543 
Transfer jobs  0.695*** 2.005 0.658*** 1.930  ns   
Farmers  ns ns ns ns  -0.326*  0.722 
End of national currency  0.676*** 1.966 0.681*** 1.975  ns  ns 
Constant  ns ns ns ns ns ns 
N   5190 - 3886 - 1304 - 
R square Nagelkerke  0.145 - 0.172 - 0.128 - 
Notes: Missing values attributed. Cases weighted as indicated in columns. 
Cell entries are beta coefficient of logistic binary regressions and transformed odds ratios [exp(b)]. Values 
of beta coefficients are not comparable within the same regression; the size of odds ratio can be 
compared. 
Source: EB62 (2004). 
If we focus on fears among EU-15 citizens, those who fear an increase in drug trafficking and 
international crime, those who fear an erosion of the welfare state, an economic crisis and the 
transfer of jobs to other member countries, and those who regret the elimination of the national 
currency are more likely to prefer a European constitution over future enlargements. Those who 
fear that small states would lose power and those who fear a loss of national identity and 
culture, meanwhile, are more likely to prefer widening over deepening. This last finding is quite 
interesting and suggests a rarely considered explanation: is it integration (deepening) that is 
believed to jeopardise cultural diversity, and not enlargement (widening) which would secure it. 
This is perhaps an astonishing finding, and one that seems to be in clear contradiction with our 
conclusions regarding support for Turkey’s membership (Ruiz-Jiménez &Torreblanca, 2007). In 
the case of Turkey, the perception that the country still exhibited too many cultural differences 
with the EU was negatively correlated with support for Turkish accession. Our difficulty here is 
to establish the connection between the perception of these cultural differences and EU citizens’ 
fears of losing national identities and cultures. At the same time, we have to keep in mind that 
our findings in this study show that these fears are negatively correlated with support for future 
enlargement (as in the case of Turkey) and positively correlated with the preference for 
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interviewees). Thus, although the perception of cultural differences between the EU and 
enlargement countries will have a negative effect on public support for specific candidates, that 
perception does not automatically translate into fears of losing national identities and cultures as 
the consequences of those entries.  
Among NMS-10+ citizens, on one hand, the fear that small states would lose power and the fear 
of an economic crisis contribute to a preference for a European constitution over future 
enlargements. On the other hand, those citizens who fear for the well-being of national 
agriculture are more likely to support enlargement than a constitution. 
It is true that in a number of older member states, in which elites speak clearly of a trade-off 
between deepening and widening, we have also observed some tensions among citizens 
regarding these two policies. But our findings far from confirm the existence of this trade-off in 
the eyes of citizens. Even in countries like the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Finland, France, 
Germany or Austria, there is a statistically significant positive relationship in public opinion 
between deepening and widening: more than 40% of their citizens who support an EU 
constitution also support future enlargements. In fact, the best predictor in older and newer 
member states to know whether a citizen is in favour or against an EU constitution is to know 
whether he/she is for or against enlargement. Those who do not support enlargement are also 
less likely to support an EU constitution. Only in a few countries have we found that the 
percentage of those who support a constitution but oppose enlargement is (slightly) higher than 
the percentage of those who support both a constitution and enlargement. The difference 
between these two percentages ranges from between 4 points in Luxembourg to 13 in Germany 
West (5 points in France, 6 in Germany East and 10 in Austria). This difference is just too small 
to talk of a generalised sense of trade-off between deepening and widening in these countries. 
Moreover, it is too small, in quite a small subset of countries, to talk about a generalised sense 
of trade-off among European member states. Even in older member states only around one-third 
of the population perceived this trade-off (percentages are lower within the EU-25 or NMS-
10+); meanwhile, more than one-half, even in older member states, sees both policies as rather 
compatible.  
A first conclusion to draw from these findings is that the feeling of a trade-off between 
deepening and widening in public opinion is weak. Thus it is not popular pressure or the desire 
to satisfy popular demand that is driving elites, especially in older member states, to present 
such a discourse about trade-offs. In other words, public opinion is not constraining elites and 
forcing them to choose. Whereas elites have their own assumptions, fears and reasons to 
understand both processes as incompatible, these are not necessarily shared by ordinary citizens. 
In fact, despite the claims of interested policy-makers, we can affirm that public opinion does 
not per se oppose further deepening and widening. If and when deepening and widening are in 
trouble, we conclude, this reflects elite more than popular preoccupations.   
Regarding fears of building the EU and their impact on citizen support for deepening and 
widening, it is interesting to point out that citizens share the elites’ fears (increasing 
contributions to the EU budget, relocation of business, etc.) and that these fears have shown a 
statistically significant, although quite small, negative impact on support for future 
enlargements. However, contrary to expectations based on elite discourses and attitudes, we 
have found that among citizens these fears also have a negative impact on support for a 
constitution. We can thus conclude that fears of what building the EU would bring are not a 
compelling reason to prefer deepening over widening. However, delving deeper in our analysis, 
it can be seen that a larger number of fears are shared by citizens in a larger number of older 
member states, which also results in a negative impact on support for enlargement. In fact, there 
are more fears that have a negative impact on enlargement than there are that have a negative 
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widening, the fear of a transfer of jobs to other member countries has a positive impact on 
support for a constitution and a negative one on support for widening.  
When it comes to establishing the research agenda based on these preliminary findings, we 
might argue for a shift in focus from explaining why and how deepening and widening are 
incompatible to focusing on why and how, given their complementarity, these two policies can 
reinforce each other. There are several lines of analysis worth pursuing. First, lessons might be 
learned about what citizens demand from the EU in terms of specific policies; that is, what kind 
of policies are demanded by citizens who share specific fears as compared to those who do not 
share the same fears? Second, it would be interesting to carry out an aggregated analysis at the 
country level, taking into account information such as percentages of unemployment, payments 
to the EU, GDP increases, balance of payments, percentage and origin of immigrant population, 
etc. Third, we will need to analyse mass media in order to reveal their portraits of public 
attitudes toward deepening and widening. Our hypothesis is that elites might use the 
manipulability of perception of mass collectives to pursue their goals (Mutz, 1998: 13), and that 
mass media will thus reflect the idea of a more generalised feeling of a trade-off than our data 
have shown. It will also be interesting to compare citizens’ attitudes toward the 2004 
enlargement with their attitudes toward future enlargements: Has support decreased? Were fears 
less pronounced regarding the 2004 enlargement?  
Conclusions 
Main findings  
First, we find a strong positive correlation between preferences for deepening and preferences 
for widening. This means that those who favour deepening tend also to favour widening, and 
that those who are against deepening tend to also be against widening. Those who are in favour 
of further integration but want no further enlargement and those who are in favour of further 
enlargement but want no further integration are a minority. Thus the perception of a trade-off 
between deepening and widening, which seems so widespread among political elites and key 
opinion-makers, is not as widely shared as one would tend to believe. The best predictor, in both 
older and newer member states, of whether a citizen is in favour of further integration is 
whether he/she is in favour of enlargement. Conversely, those who do not support enlargement 
are also likely to be against a European Constitution. 
Our finding is congruent with other empirical studies (Karp and Bowler, 2006; Sánchez-Cuenca 
and Fernández-Albertos, 2005) that show that there is a strong correlation between preferences 
for deepening and widening. If and when support for enlargement is a function of support for 
integration, it is no wonder that support for enlargement has declined since 2000: as support for 
European integration in general has declined, so has support for a particular aspect of it 
(enlargement).  
The fact that many Europeans consider enlargement as a part of the integration process, and not 
as an exogenous element to it, might have important analytical and policy consequences. On the 
one hand, it justifies considering that the “No” votes in the French and Dutch referenda were not 
directly caused by negative attitudes towards enlargement. On the other hand, whereas the 
recent turn in enlargement policy has been based on the argument that in order to rescue the 
integration process, the EU needs to put a halt to enlargement, our findings allow for a different 
hypothesis, namely that support for further enlargement will grow once the integration process 
is back on track. Therefore, to the extent to which enlargement is not the cause of the present 
low levels of support for European integration, removing this element will not have a direct 
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Second, we find exceptions to the general rule (the positive correlation between deepening and 
widening) in four countries: Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and France. Here, the positive 
correlation still holds (with 40% of those who support further integration being also in favour of 
further enlargement), but there are significant tensions among supporters of further integration 
over whether the EU should enlarge. Those who see a trade-off between deepening and 
widening are clearly concentrated in the EEC-6 countries with the exception of Austria. In 
contrast, citizens from late-comer countries (again, with the exception of Austria) tend to be 
more positive and optimistic about the compatibility of deepening and widening. These ‘hesitant 
Europeans’, to use the expression coined by Karp and Bowler (2006), tend to live in founding 
member states: according to our data, one-third of EU founding member state citizens consider 
that there is a trade-off between deepening and widening, compared to only one-fifth in newer 
member states. The more Europeanist citizens of older member states are in fact those who are 
most wary of further enlargement. 
Third, after exploring whether citizens’ fears (of crime, unemployment, immigration, loss of 
sovereignty, etc.) explain attitudes against a Constitution or further enlargement, we find that 
that these have a greater impact on support for enlargement than on support for integration. In 
particular, fears of job losses negatively affect support for enlargement among EEC-6 member 
states. This means that many citizens still see further integration as the adequate response to 
their fears, but that they worry than an expanded EU might not be able to efficiently tackle these 
issues. Parallel to this, we also find that fears of losing sovereignty, paying more to the budget 
and losing social benefits are key to explaining negative attitudes towards integration, especially 
in older member states. We thus find that fears play a role but that they can negatively affect 
deepening as well as widening. In other words, while these fears exist, it cannot be easily seen 
how much more or less deepening and widening they imply.  
We conclude by suggesting that the widespread negative consensus on enlargement found at the 
elite level might not necessarily have a correlate at the public level. Beliefs in the existence of a 
trade-off between deepening and widening, which are only apparent in a limited number of 
(founding) countries – and even there shared only by a minority of citizens (one-third) – might 
thus be more qualified than usually acknowledged. It is true that support for enlargement has 
consistently declined since the beginning of the decade. However, we see strong indicators 
suggesting that this is a consequence of a parallel decline in support for integration, not 
necessarily a cause of it. Therefore, whereas recent EU enlargement policy changes, which have 
made it more restrictive, have been justified on the grounds of needing to relieve the public’s 
discomfort with existing enlargement policy, we wonder both whether this change was justified 
and whether it will have a marked impact on increasing support for integration.   
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Appendix I. Methodological note 
For this analysis we used 2004 post-enlargement Eurobarometer 62.0 
(see http://europa .eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm).  
Countries  Institutes  N°   Fieldwork dates  Population 15+  
   Interviews    
Austria   Österreichisches 
Gallup-Institute   1,007   11-10/07-11/2004   6,679,444  
Belgium   TNS Dimarso   974   08-10/08-11/2004   8,598,982  
Denmark   TNS Gallup DK   1,028   06-10/08-11/2004   4,380,062  
France   TNS Sofres   1,020   14-10/30-10/2004   44,010,619  
Finland   TNS Gallup OY   1,005   10-10/04-11/2004   4,279,286  
Germany (East)   TNS Infratest   508   11-10/27-10/2004   12,802,222  
Germany (West)   TNS Infratest   1,037   08-10/27-10/2004   51,372,073  
Greece   TNS ICAP   1,000   11-10/31-10/2004  8,674,230   
United Kingdom   TNS UK   1310   05-10/08-11/2004   46,371,359  
Ireland   TNS MRBI   1,000   08-10/08-11/2004   3,089,775  
Italy   TNS Abacus   1,020   11-10/01-11/2004   49,208,000  
Luxembourg   TNS ILReS   502   05-10/26-10/2004   367,199  
Netherlands   TNS NIPO   1,009   07-10/04-11/2004   13,242,328  
Portugal   TNS EUROTESTE   1,000   02-10/01-11/2004   8,080,915  
Spain   TNS Demoscopia   1,023   06-10/27-10/2004   35,882,820  
Sweden   TNS GALLUP   1,000   02-10/01-11/2004   7,376,680  
Cyprus (South)   Synovate   500   10-10/31-10/2004   552,213  
Czech Republic   TNS Aisa   1,075  15-10/30-10/2004   8,571,710  
Estonia   Emor   1,000   08-10/28-10/2004   887,094  
Hungary   TNS Hungary   1,014   10-10/28-10/2004   8,503,379  
Latvia   TNS Baltic Data House   1,005   12-10/03-11/2004   1,394,351  
Lithuania   TNS Gallup Lithuania   1,002   10-10/30-10/2004   2,803,661  
Malta   MISCO   500   03-10/22-10/2004   322,917  
Poland   TNS OBOP   1,000   16-10/03-11/2004   31,610,437  
Slovakia   TNS AISA SK   1,252   02-10/30-10/2004   4,316,438  
Slovenia   RM PLUS   1,000   19-10/05-11/2004   1,663,869  
Bulgaria   TNS BBSS   1,004   12-10/24-10/2004   6,695,512  
Romania   TNS CSOP   1,012   14-10/27-10/2004   18,145,036  
Turkey   TNS PIAR   1,027   09-10/26-10/2004   47,583,830  
Croatia   PULS   1,000   14-10/03-11/2004   3,682,826  
Cyprus (North)   KADEM   500   15-10/28-10/2004   157,101  
For our dependent variables (support for an EU constitution and support for enlargement), as 
well as fears of building the EU, we considered those who did not answer as missing values, and 
recoded the variables as 1 (support for a European Constitution, support for future enlargement, 
currently afraid of), or 0 (against a Constitution or enlargement and currently not afraid of). 
Then we assigned values to missing data using linear interpolation. The resulting values 
between 0.00 and 0.50 were codified as 0; values between 0.51 and 1 were codified as 1. 
The attribution of values to missing data does not significantly change results. We have run the 
analysis with and without attribution, observing a minimum impact on the size of coefficients 
and no change at all in signs. Only on rare occasions did some coefficients that were close to, 
but below, statistical significance become significant.  
We use weights when appropriate and indicate it in our results.  
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member think tanks from 21 countries, including most EU member states and candidate 
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analysis of all the different national debates, and of the complex political dynamics of the 
pan-European debate.  
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•  To promote and develop pan-European debate and understanding on the key 
issues associated with the future of Europe.  
 
•  To promote discussion and understanding of the political dynamics of the different 
national debates, and trans-European comparisons of discourse on EU-related 
issues. 
 
•  To hold meetings in the member states and candidate countries and further 
meetings in Brussels offering different national views of the debate, involving a range 
of different civil society actors as well as policy-makers, analysts and commentators. 
 
•  To develop interaction, contacts and exchange of information and analysis 
across the members of the network. 
 
•  To undertake and encourage joint analysis and to publish joint working papers 
on the key issues of the debate. 
 
•  To promote international communication and dissemination of the network’s 
activities and outputs.  
 
EPIN is coordinated by a Steering Committee made up of representatives of the Centre 
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Notre Europe (France), the Real Instituto Elcano (Spain), the Swedish Institute for 
European Policy Studies (SIEPS, Sweden) and the Centre for European Reform (CER, UK).